K-Hub PCVE Outlook #1

Tracking the Impact of PCVE Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) in Indonesia



- 1 List of Abbreviations
- Mapping of CSOs' Programs in 2 the Implementation of NAP PE
- 10 **NAP PE Implementation**
- **Pillar 1: Prevention: Preparedness,** 12 **Counter-Radicalism, and Deradicalisation Preparedness Aspect**

Preparedness Aspect **Deradicalisation Aspect Counter-Radicalisation Aspect**

Pillar 2: Law Enforcement, Protection of Witnesses and Victims, and Strengthening of **National Legislative Framework**

Law Enforcement Aspect Witness and Victim Protection Aspect

Strengthening of the National Legislative Framework Aspect

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Pillar 3: Partnership and International Cooperation

Partnership Aspect International Cooperation Aspect

- **CSOs Collaboration**
- **Best Practices**
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- **Editorial Team**

No.	Abbreviations	Explanation
1.	Bapas	Corrections Centre
2.	BNPT	National Counter-Terrorism Agency
3.	CSO	Civil Society Organisation
4.	Ditjenpas	Directorate General of Corrections
5.	FGD	Focus Group Discussion
6.	HAM	Human Rights
7.	K/L	Ministry/Agency
8.	Kemenkumham	Ministry of Law and Human Rights
9.	KemenPPPA	Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection
10.	KPAI	Indonesian Child Protection Commission
11.	Lapas	Corrections Institutions
12.	Litmas	Community Research
13.	Napiter	Terrorism Inmates
14.	NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation
15.	OMS	Civil Society Organisation
16.	PCVE	Preventing & Countering Violent Extremism
17.	Pokja	Working Group
18.	Polri	Indonesian National Police
19.	Poltekip	Institute of Corrections Sciences
20.	PVE	Preventing Violent Extremism
21.	NAP PE / RAN PE	National Action Plan for Prevention and Countering Violent Extremism Leading to Terrorism / Rencana Aksi Nasional Pencegahan dan Penanggulangan Ekstremisme Berbasis Kekerasan yang Mengarah pada Terorisme
22.	RUU	Draft Law
23.	Rutan	Detention Centre
24.	SDM	Human Resources
25.	TNI	Indonesian National Army
26.	UPT	Integrated Service Unit
27.	YPP	Prasasti Perdamaian Foundation




Mapping of CSOs' Programs in the Implementation of NAP PE

In 2020, the <u>International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development (INFID)</u>, in collaboration with Milla et al., conducted a mapping of violent extremism prevention programs implemented by the government and non-governmental organisations in Indonesia between 2014 and 2019. One of the findings from the research highlighted several limitations in Indonesia's violent extremism prevention programs. These limitations include limited intervention coverage, the prevalence of general prevention programs needing more focus on target categories and intervention types, and a weak collaboration among stakeholders in implementing Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE) in Indonesia.


To address the challenges in preventing and mitigating cases of violent extremism, the government has taken steps to address these issues by enacting Presidential Regulation of the Republic of Indonesia No. 7 of 2021 concerning the National Action Plan for Prevention and Countering Violent Extremism Leading to Terrorism (NAP PE) for the year 2020-2024. NAP PE was signed on 6 January 2021 and is being actively promoted and implemented by relevant PCVE actors. It is expected that NAP PE will serve as a concrete measure to respond to various issues of violent extremism that pose a growing threat and disrupt national security stability.

Graphic 1.1 The Number of Terrorist Attacks in Indonesia per Year Source: Global Terrorism Database



NAP PE encompasses a framework of government programs aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of preventing and countering violent extremism. These programs are fundamentally divided into three pillars. The first pillar is the prevention pillar which covers the aspects of preparedness, counterradicalisation, and deradicalisation. The second pillar is the law enforcement pillar, the protection of witnesses and victims, and the strengthening of national legislative frameworks. The third pillar is partnership and international cooperation.

Image 1.1 Hierarchy of NAP PE Pillar, Aspect, and Focus



To implement NAP PE, the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT) has established a Working Group (Pokja) for NAP PE, consisting of representatives from 48 relevant ministries/agencies. The Pokja for NAP PE is divided into three sub-Pokjas: Pokja Pillar 1, coordinated by the Deputy for Prevention, Protection, and Deradicalisation of BNPT; Pokja Pillar 2, coordinated by the Deputy for Enforcement and Capacity Building of BNPT; and Pokja Pillar 3, coordinated by the Deputy for Foreign Politics of the Coordinating Ministry for Political, Legal, and Security Affairs (Kemenko Polhukam). Establishing these Pokjas aims to foster collaboration and build a solid commitment to implementing NAP PE. In addition to establishing the Pokja for NAP PE involving relevant ministries/agencies, the BNPT has approved a Thematic Working Group, primarily involving Civil Society Organisations (CSOs). The Thematic Working Group was approved on 20 October 2022, as a platform for CSOs to actively participate in implementing NAP PE, particularly by engaging at the local level through official mechanisms. Currently, 36 CSOs have joined the Thematic Working Group. They are working in seven primary areas, namely:

- **1.** Gender mainstreaming,
- 2. Witness protection and victim rights fulfilment,
- **3.** Youth involvement,
- 4. Strategic communication,
- 5. National preparedness,
- **6.** Rehabilitation and social reintegration, and
- **7.** Law and human rights.

The implementation reports of each participating CSO will be compiled in the annual Thematic Working Group report.

It is obvious that the existence of NAP PE and its related working groups is expected to facilitate the implementation process of CSOs and government programs. However, there is currently no available data or findings provided regarding the extent of CSOs' role in supporting the implementation of NAP PE. These overlaps occur in the field regarding implementing CSOs programs and the specific areas requiring improvement in these programs.

The research was conducted for three months, from 17 November 2022, to 16 February 2023. It involved the Laboratory of Political Psychology at the University of Indonesia and the K-Hub Team. The K-Hub PCVE Outlook #1 research intends to map the roles of CSOs as actors to prevent and address violent extremism in Indonesia. Furthermore, the research intends to map the contributions of CSOs' programs to the three pillars of NAP PE.

The initial survey process identified a total of 90 PCVE actors. Among them, 34 actors were CSOs who also participated as respondents in the INFID research. It was figured out that four of them were donor agencies, resulting in 86 PCVE actors categorised as CSOs. Based on the consideration of the availability of

program data, these 86 PCVE actors were further reduced to 81 actors.

To obtain information on the roles of CSOs as actors in preventing and countering violent extremism in Indonesia, the team utilised various research instruments and involved researchers as well as the participation of CSO representatives. The research process consisted of several stages: identification of secondary data collection, survey implementation, and Focus Group Discussions (FGDs). Secondary data collection was conducted on the 81 CSOs by exploring various information about their organisations and programs from websites, social media, program reports, and previous research data. After the secondary data collection process, FGDs and surveys were conducted to complement the data. Due to the internal commitments of each CSO and other challenging factors, the number of CSOs involved in the FGDs and surveys may not match the initial 81 CSOs identified during the secondary data collection process. The FGDs were attended by 59 CSOs, while the survey was completed by 27 CSOs. It was continued with data triangulation after the completion of the data collection process.

Based on the categorisation made in this research, the 81 CSOs are divided into three scopes: 6 international CSOs, 54 national CSOs, and 21 local CSOs. Each CSO has various core program focuses, with the following distribution of locations¹:

No.	Domicile Province of Organisations	Number of Organisations
1.	DKI Jakarta	40
2.	Jawa Barat	7
3.	Banten	3
4.	Jawa Tengah	4
5.	Jawa Timur	3
6.	Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta	6
7.	Maluku	2
8.	Sulawesi Tengah	2

Table 1.1 Organisation's Province of Domicile

9.	Sulawesi Selatan	3
10.	Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam	2
11.	Kalimantan Timur	1
12.	N/A (Not Available)	8
	Total	81

¹ Each CSO has a core program focus, which is divided into 11 areas:

- Research: CSOs with a research focus have a core program that designs various efforts to conduct research and collect databases related to PCVE issues. As well as designing and providing recommendations to related parties.
- Peace Building: CSOs focusing on peacebuilding have a core program to design various campaigns related to the values of peace and tolerance in a sustainable manner.
- Associations: CSOs with an association focus have core programs to mobilize or accommodate various groups in
 overcoming issues that align with PCVE.
- Deradicalization: CSOs with a focus on deradicalisation have a program core that refers to counter-terrorism preventive actions or strategies to neutralise ideas that are considered radical and dangerous using a non-violent approach.
- Human Rights: CSOs focusing on human rights have a core program with various efforts to protect people from violence and arbitrariness. As well as developing steps for mutual respect between humans.
- Diversity: CSOs with a diversity focus have a core program on cooperative, constructive and positive interactions between people of different religious traditions and/or spiritual or humanistic beliefs, focusing on diversity in ethnicity, race, certain beliefs, religion, culture, and gender.
- Counter-narrative: CSOs with a counter-narrative focus have a core program in broadcasting information related to understanding that counteracts the spread of radicalism in society. The information or messages are disseminated in the form of activities to content distributed through social media or special websites.
- Community Empowerment: CSOs focusing on community empowerment have a core program to invite or mobilise communities to be actively involved in responding to issues around them. The program also focuses on specific areas or communities.
- Dakwah: CSOs focusing on da'wah have a core program related to disseminating religious messages and use specific approaches in religion to convey messages.
- Women: CSOs focusing on women have core programs related to women's development, protection and empowerment. As well as various efforts to provide critical awareness of the issues experienced by women in the surrounding community.
- Survivors: CSOs focusing on survivors have core programs for victims or families affected by extreme behaviour or terrorism. As well as having a number of reconciliation efforts and trauma recovery processes for the events experienced.

After the process of data collection and analysis, a total of 448 CSOs' programs were identified as PCVE initiatives ranging from 2020 to 2022, with the following distribution of program locations²:

Table 1.2Distribution of Program Locations

No.	Provinces	Number of Programs
1.	Banten	23
2.	DKI Jakarta	44
3.	Jawa Barat	63
4.	Jawa Tengah	54
5.	Jawa Timur	35
6.	Daerah Istimewa Yogyakarta	33
7.	Maluku	4
8.	Sulawesi Selatan	15
9.	Sulawesi Tengah	12
10.	Sulawesi Barat	1
11.	Sulawesi Utara	3
12.	Bengkulu	2
13.	Papua	2
14.	Papua Barat	3
15.	NTT	1
16.	NTB	4
17.	Gorontalo	1
18.	Bali	1
19.	Kalimatan Tengah	1
20.	Kalimatan Timur	2
21.	Kalimatan Barat	4
22.	Kalimatan Selatan	4
23.	Kalimatan Utara	1
24.	Sumatera Selatan	1
25.	Sumatera Utara	1
26.	Sumatera Barat	4

27.	Riau	1
28.	Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam	8
29.	Lampung	2
30.	Unselected	15
31.	Unrecognized	68

The identified programs were further classified based on their contributions to NAP PE, including pillars, aspects, focuses, and strategies.


² Due to the difficulty of accurately tracking each participant's location, the location recorded for the online activity is the location of the event organiser. This map also does not contain the locations of 177 national programs and three international programs. Overall, 593 points (from each provincial, national and international program) were listed as PCVE program intervention areas in Indonesia. This number differs from the previously identified 448 programs because one program may have >1 intervention area. Further, more profound research is urgently needed.



NAP PE Implementation

NAP PE³ is a series of systematically planned activities to prevent and counter violence-based extremism that leads to terrorism. NAP PE serves as a reference for ministries, agencies, and local governments in undertaking prevention and countering efforts against violence-based extremism leading to terrorism.

Image 2.1 Graphic of CSOs' Program Contribution Percentage in NAP PE Pillars



IMPLEMENTATION OF THREE PILLARS IN NAP PE

Out of the 448 programs conducted by actors engaged in preventing and countering violent extremism, the dominant programs carried out by PCVE actors are those contributing to Pillar 1 of NAP PE. Conversely, only some programs that contribute to Pillar 3 are carried out. The following section will present a more detailed breakdown of CSOs' contributions to each pillar.

³ From the 448 programs carried out by actors who play a role in preventing and countering violent extremism, the programs that PCVE actors dominantly carry out contribute to Pillar 1 of NAP PE. Meanwhile, very few programs contribute to Pillar 3. In more detail, CSO contributions to each pillar are presented in the next section.

03 Pillar 1

Prevention: Preparedness, Counter-Radicalism, and Deradicalisation Preparedness Aspect Pillar 1 of NAP PE encompasses programs focusing on monitoring, early detection, and early prevention of actions and messages of violence-based extremism leading to terrorism. In NAP PE, the programs listed under Pillar 1 are divided into three Aspects: (1) Preparedness Aspect, (2) Counter-Radicalisation Aspect, and (3) Deradicalisation Aspect. The survey results indicate that a total of 379 PCVE programs are conducted by 81 CSOs supporting Pillar 1 of NAP PE. The majority of CSOs' programs support the Counter-Radicalisation Aspect (47.6%) and the Preparedness Aspect (44.8%), while only a few programs support the Deradicalisation Aspect (6.3%).

Pillar 1 Preparedness Aspect

The preparedness aspect in Pillar 1 encompasses PCVE actors' efforts to improve supporting data on prevention; raise awareness and build capacity among stakeholders regarding the risks of violence-based extremism leading to terrorism and their response; monitor the effectiveness of securing vital objects; and implement the Ministerial Regulation on Empowerment of Women and Child Protection about the Guidelines for Protecting Children from Radicalisation and Terrorist Activities.

Fokus	Strategy	Number
Supporting Data	Providing and Integrating Data	53
	Developing Early Detection System	6
Stakeholders' Awareness and	Improving State Apparatuses' Sensitivity and Resilience	10
Capacity	Improving CSOs'/Communities' Capacity	80
Efectiveness of Security of Vital Objects	Providing Data of Vital Objects	0
	Optimising the System of Security and Early Detection of Vital Objects	0
Children's Resilience	Implementing the Ministerial Regulation on Women's Empowerment and Child Protection No. 7 Year 2019	21

Table 3.1 Focuses and Strategies in Preparedness Aspect

Table 3.1 illustrates that the dominant strategy conducted by PCVE actors in implementing PCVE programs is to improve stakeholders' awareness and capacity, including both community/civil society organisations and government agencies. PCVE actors focusing on peacebuilding (22 actors) and diversity (23 actors) predominantly utilise this strategy. Activities carried out include training

and mentoring local actors in preparedness work and raising awareness, as well as promoting the role of women in preventing and countering violent extremism.

On the other hand, PCVE actors in Indonesia do not primarily conduct specific efforts to improve the effectiveness in securing vital objects and public areas from the threat of violent extremism. One of the indications is that the security of vital objects and public areas falls under the government's jurisdiction, particularly state security institutions such as the Indonesian National Police (Polri), the Indonesian National Army (TNI), and other relevant agencies.

Pillar 1 Deradicalisation Aspect

Regarding the deradicalisation aspect, PCVE actors' deradicalisation efforts are predominantly conducted for internal Corrections Institutions (Lapas) rather than external **(refer to Table 2)**. Deradicalisation efforts within Corrections Institutions target not only inmates but also prison staff, the Corrections Centre (Bapas), and Detention Centres (Rutan), such as by enhancing the capacity of personnel to address radicalisation in prisons/detention centres. On the other hand, deradicalisation efforts outside Corrections Institutions include optimising the reintegration of former inmates and community acceptance efforts.

Focus	Strategy	Numbe
	Integrating Standard of Competences of Officials and Direction of NAP PE	5
	Conducting Studies of Instrument of Assessment and Management and Rehabilitation of Inmates	1
Deradicalisation in	Improving the Effectiveness of Deradicalisation Program	1
Corrections Institutions	Improving Effectiveness of Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Former Terrorist Inmates in Deradicalisation Based on Risk Data and Need Assessment Program	7
	Developing the Method of Handling Child Engagement in Terrorism	0
	Integrating Direction of NAP PE and Reformation of Corrections Institutions	0
Deradicalisation outside Corrections Institutions	Optimising Deradicalisation outside Corrections Institutions	2
	Optimising Program Infrastructure/Tools of Deradicalisation outside Corrections Institutions	2
	Improving Capacity of the Correctional Institutions' Officials in the Program of Deradicalisation Outside Correctional Institutions	1
	Strengthening Supporting Villages Institutions for Programs of Deradicalisation Outside Correctional Institutions	5

Table 3.2Focuses and Strategies in Deradicalisation Aspect of Pillar 1 of NAP PE

Table 3.2 shows that the dominant strategies implemented by CSOs as PCVE actors focus on deradicalisation within correctional facilities are Improving Rehabilitation and Reintegration Effectiveness for Inmates in Deradicalisation Programs based on Data of Risk and Needs Assessment, as well as Integrating Officer Competency Standards and the National Action Plan on Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (NAP PE). The PCVE actors predominantly utilise these focused on deradicalisation programs. An example of the implementation of this strategy is the training of community companions and prison officers.

Strategies such as Developing Methods or Mechanisms for Handling Involved Children and Integrating NAP PE and Prison Reforms are not implemented by CSOs as PCVE actors. One indication of this is that the establishment of mechanisms for handling children and integrating NAP PE and prison reforms require support from the government authority and policy stakeholders such as the Ministry of Law and Human Rights (Kemenkumham), the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT), the Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection (KemenPPPA), and the Indonesian Child Protection Commission (KPAI).

Meanwhile, the strategy for deradicalisation outside Corrections Institutions predominantly employed is Strengthening Supporting Villages Institutions to Support Deradicalisation Programs outside Corrections Institutions (50%). This strategy is used by CSOs with various program focuses, such as deradicalisation, peacebuilding, human rights, associations, and counter-narratives. Activities using this strategy include entrepreneurship training, detainee mentoring, and raising awareness and acceptance within communities to facilitate the reintegration process of former terrorist inmates into society.

Pillar 1 Counter-Radicalisation Aspect

The Counter-Radicalisation Aspect focuses on improving the effectiveness of campaigns to prevent violent extremism within vulnerable groups and efforts to increase the resilience of these groups. From 185 programs within the Counter-Radicalisation Aspect, the dominant focus carried out by CSOs for PCVE is the Enhancement of Campaign Effectiveness. In total, 116 PCVE programs supported by the CSOs align with this focus.

Table 3.3

Focuses and Strategies of Counter-Radicalisation Aspect Pillar 1 of NAP PE

Focus	Strategy	Number
Campaign Effectiveness	Indicator of Campaign Effectiveness	2
	Integrating Material on Prevention Including Critical Thinking in the Teaching System and Curriculum of Formal Education	9
	Reviewing the Effectiveness of Supporting Teaching Material for Prevention	1
	Improving the Role of Traditional/Modern Leading Community Figures in Campaigns	104
	Developing Pilot Areas for Strengthening Resilience	5
Vulnerable Groups' Resilience	Improving the Effectiveness of Community Police for Prevention	1
	Improving Youth Public Participation Spaces for Prevention	25
	Improving Youth Capacity as Actors for Peace and Diversity Values	38

Table 3.3 shows that the most dominant strategy implemented by the PCVE CSOs to improve campaign effectiveness is Improving the Role of Traditional/Modern Leading Community Figures. This strategy is widely employed by CSOs with a peacebuilding focus through Creative & Innovative Campaign activities such as films, games, and so on.

On the other hand, strategies related to evaluating the success and effectiveness, such as the Development of Campaign Success Indicators, Reviewing the Effectiveness of Supporting Teaching Material for Prevention, and Improving the Effectiveness of Community Police for Prevention, are rarely implemented by CSOs as PCVE actors. The limited use of strategies concerning evaluating and assessing campaign effectiveness can present an opportunity for relevant government agencies and CSOs to develop future program plans.

04 Pillar 2

Law Enforcement, Protection of Witnesses and Victims, and Strengthening of National Legislative Framework Pillar 2 of NAP PE consists of programs aimed at improving research efforts, protecting witnesses and victims, and strengthening the national legislative framework. Within Pillar 2, the NAP PE programs are divided into three aspects: Law Enforcement Aspect, Witness and Victim Protection Aspect, and National Legislative Framework Aspect. The survey results indicate that out of the total PCVE programs assessed, 28 CSOs have implemented 52 programs (11.6%) related to the Law Enforcement Aspect, Witness and Victim Protection Aspect, and National Legislative Framework Aspect.

Pillar 2 Law Enforcement Aspect

The Law Enforcement Aspect focuses on supporting law enforcement efforts in handling extremism and terrorist crimes. This aspect includes six strategies that focus on strengthening the coordination among law enforcement agencies and efforts to improve the capacity of law enforcement personnel.

The focus on strengthening coordination is closely related to the nature of law enforcement agencies operating in the monitoring and response to terrorist crimes. Law enforcement agencies like Densus 88 are crucial in obtaining updated, accurate, and timely information regarding extremism and terrorism. Some strategies outlined in the NAP PE concerning improving law enforcement performance include optimising coordination and information exchange among law enforcement agencies, ensuring regular reporting, and establishing specialised complaint units for law enforcement violations in terrorist crimes. The survey results indicate that the PCVE programs implemented by CSOs to support this focus mainly intend to improve the effectiveness of information exchange.

Furthermore, the issue of capacity building to support standardised knowledge on handling extremism and terrorist crimes is also identified within the Law Enforcement Aspect of Pillar 2 of the NAP PE. Strategies such as providing guideline books and sustaining capacity-building efforts for law enforcement personnel can help them be prepared to address the challenges of combating extremism and terrorist crimes in the future.

Table 4.1Focuses and Strategies in Law Enforcement Aspect

Focus	Strategy	Number
	Implementing Inter-Institution Coordination for the Identification of Law Enforcement Aspects.	0
Coordination of Law	Preparing the Periodical Report of Law Enforcement for Countering Terrorism Crime	0
Enforcement Stakeholders	Providing the Special Complaint Unit for Violations of Law Enforcement for Countering Terrorism Crime	0

	Improving the Effectiveness of Inter-Institution Information Exchange	11
Law Enforcement	Providing an Integrated Law Enforcement Guidelines Handbook	2
Stakeholders' Capacity	Improving Law Enforcers' Capacity	0

Table 4.1 shows the distribution of CSOs' programs in the Law Enforcement Aspect. The programs that fall under the strategy of improving the effectiveness of information exchange involve the provision/facilitation of forums that gather various local policymakers in counter-terrorism efforts. By recognising each other's identities and roles, the information distribution regarding countering extremism and terrorist crimes is not limited to a single institution. However, the survey results indicate limitations in implementing CSOs programs in the Law Enforcement Aspect.

Furthermore, there is a significant gap in the distribution of programs between Improving Effectiveness and other strategies within the Law Enforcement Aspect (refer to Table 4). Meanwhile, providing an integrated guidelines handbook is still implemented to a minimal extent. The limitations in implementing strategies in both focuses are expected due to the limited authority of CSOs to design programs related to law enforcement agencies such as the National Police, the military (TNI), the prosecutor's office, the courts, and others. CSOs with a role in implementing programs in these two strategies mostly fall under the focus areas of Research with five actors, Human Rights with four actors, and Deradicalisation with one actor.

Pillar 2 Witness and Victim Protection Aspect

The Witness and Victim Protection Aspect have only one focus on four main strategies. The focus on witness and victim protection includes strategies for improving prevention on campuses through reporting mechanisms, establishing an endowment fund scheme for victims, developing a reconciliation scheme, and implementing policy guidelines for the reconciliation scheme. These strategies aim to address issues related to the reporting optimisation of witnesses, victims, and reporters, the source of funds for victim compensation, and the optimisation of victim-perpetrator reconciliation.

Table 4.2
Focuses and Strategies in Witness and Victim Protection Aspect

Focus	Strategy	Number
Witness and Victim Protection	Improving Preventing Efforts on Higher Education Institutes/Campuses	4
	Preparing an Endowment Fund Scheme for Terrorism Victims	1
	Developing a Reconciliation Scheme for Victim-Perpetrator	0
	Formatting Policy of Guidelines for Reconciliation for Victim- Perpetrator	0

Table 4.1 describes the distribution of programs that relies on increasing the utilisation of campus reporting mechanisms and the development of an endowment fund scheme for victims. The work showcases the implementation of both strategies through survivor mentoring or establishing a survivor database, as well as fundraising for survivors affected up to a certain level.

CSOs contributing to implementing the Witness and Victim Protection Aspect include two actors focusing on the Survivors field, two on Research, and one on Diversity. The limitations of programs in this aspect can be understood considering that implementing strategies targeting witnesses and survivors requires significant resources due to direct engagement with beneficiaries. Not all CSOs come with practical resources to contribute in this area.

Pillar 2 Strengthening of the National Legislative Framework Aspect

In strengthening the national legislative framework aspect, NAP PE mandates two focuses: synchronising national and international laws and strengthening domestic legislation. Within these focuses, two strategies are present for each, aiming at addressing the challenges of elevating Indonesian legal standards to an international scale and improving the efficiency of Indonesian laws regarding countering extremism.

Under the focus on aligning the national legal framework with international standards, NAP PE mandates a strategy to encourage Indonesia's involvement in international agreements and improve Indonesia's preparation of international instruments for countering extremism. In other words, this focus seeks to maximise Indonesia's role as an agent of countering extremism in the international arena.

Meanwhile, in focus on strengthening domestic legislation, the alignment of

national laws is consistently chosen as a strategy by various CSOs. These efforts are continually undertaken in association with research developments, policy papers, or studies on countering extremism conducted or written by stakeholders. However, we have not found any information regarding drafting the Bill on Firearms and Explosives Ownership.

Tabel 4.3

Focuses and Strategies: Strengthening of the National Legislative Framework Aspect

Focus	Strategy	Number
Synchronisation of National and International Laws	Encouraging Indonesia's Involvement in International Agreement based on Regulation of Laws	0
	Improving the Effectiveness of Preparation of Legalising the International Instruments based on Regulation of Laws	5
Strengthening of Law	Synchronising Laws of Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism Based on Regulations in International Law	29
	Drafting the Bill on Firearms and Explosives Ownership	0

Table 4.3 demonstrates that the strategy of strengthening the national legislative framework CSOs employ primarily focuses on the synchronisation of laws through research programs, policy papers, studies, and similar initiatives. On the other hand, Indonesia achieved increasing effectiveness in preparing the ratification of international instruments partly through disseminating the content of international frameworks to several local governments. The strategy for enhancing the effectiveness of Indonesia's preparation for international instruments is dominated by CSOs with two actors in the Peacebuilding field.

Meanwhile, the synchronisation of laws is predominantly conducted by CSOs with nine actors in the Research field, eight in Diversity, and four in peacebuilding.



Partnership and International Cooperation

Pillar 3 of NAP PE strives to establish partnerships and international cooperation. This pillar has two focuses. The first focuses on improving the partnership capacity of stakeholders, and the second focuses on fostering international cooperation in countering violence-based extremism leading to terrorism and its financing. Of all the programs CSOs reported in the survey, 17 contribute to the Capacity Building Partnership Aspect and International Cooperation Aspect. In other words, 3.79% of the programs from the surveyed CSOs contribute to Pillar 3.

Pillar 3: Partnership Aspect

Pillar 3 underlines the Capacity Building Partnership Aspect, which consists of programs that focus on improving stakeholders' partnership capacity. Five strategies are conducted and implemented in this aspect, as indicated in Table 7. However, two strategies have not been executed by international agencies, namely: (1) Developing inter-stakeholder coordination procedures and disseminating funding information by donors, and (2) Improving technical assistance mechanisms by international agencies

Table 5.1

	Focus	Strategy	Number
	Stakeholder Partnership Capacity	Identifying the Programs of Countering Extremism by Ministries/Institutions	2
		Collecting Data and Documenting Relevant Civil Society Stakeholders Addressing Countering Extremism	1
		Providing the Partnership Platform Between the Government and Civil Society Stakeholders	8
		Drafting the Procedure of Inter-Stakeholder Coordination and Dissemination of Funding Information by Donors	0
		Improving the Mechanism of Technical Assistance by International Institutions	0

Focus and Strategies in Partnership Aspect

Table 5.1 showcases that the dominant strategy applied by CSOs relies on providing partnership platforms between the government and civil society stakeholders. CSOs of PCVE-focused implementing this strategy include two actors in Peacebuilding, two in Women, and two in Associations. The activities include launching websites or establishing network consultation spaces to discuss relevant issues. However, two strategies are not found in the research. These strategies require collaboration among various parties, particularly with the government.

Pillar 3 International Cooperation Aspect

This aspect comprises CSOs programs focusing on enhancing international cooperation. The focus consists of two strategies to establish and strengthen cooperation with international partners. Several CSOs have implemented both strategies despite the small number. From the survey, a total of six CSOs programs support this aspect.

Table 5.2Focus and Strategies in International Cooperation Aspect


Focus	Strategy	Number
International Cooperation	Strengthening Inter-Law Enforcer Cooperation and Coordination for International Cooperation	3
	Improving International Cooperation	3

Table 5.2 illustrates that both strategies mentioned have been noticeable in several existing CSOs' programs. PCVE actors actively involved in these strategies include two actors in the focus of Peacebuilding, one in Deradicalisation, and three in Research. The activities include meeting with various country representatives to discuss, support, and develop various PCVE program strategies.



CSOs Collaboration


Image 6.1 Illustration of CSOs Collaboration Experience



Collaboration of Civil Society Organisations

Among all collaboration processes, the inter-CSOs collaboration dominates. However, some parties, such as educational institutions and private entities, still have minimal collaboration.

Image 6.2 Collaborators of Government Institutions




Collaborators of Government Institutions

In addition, collaboration processes with the government occupy the secondlargest position after inter-CSOs collaboration. Collaborating with various government components is essential to implementing the NAP PE. So far, BNPT has been the most dominant government institution to conduct this process. In the future, it is hoped that other government agencies will actively participate as collaborators in various CSOs programs.




Collaborators' Roles




The majority of the five existing collaboration groups engage in cooperation regarding implementing partners. Some CSOs benefit from other parties in carrying out their programs as well. In this case, diversity in collaboration is expected to continue in the future to generate more targeted programs.

Image 6.3 Illustration of CSOs' Obstacles





In general, CSOs face nine challenges during the implementation of their programs. They encounter three common general challenges: government bureaucracy, collaboration, and funding issues. Furthermore, these challenges can be examined within the CSOs' local, national, and international scope.

Image 6.3 Illustration of CSOs' Obstacles



National CSOs





International CSOs

Within the three existing scopes of local, national, and international, funding is the most commonly experienced challenge. The sustainability of programs is affected by donor assistance and inter-party collaborations. Additionally, many CSOs experience the challenges posed by the pandemic. Adjusting program formats, limited beneficiary engagement, and hindered collaboration require CSOs to adapt by designing programs that can still be implemented.




Best Practices



Based on the overall data on program implementation referring to NAP PE, several best practice programs are considered to have valuable points in specific aspects. In general, some criteria for best practice programs are:

- **1.** Programs designed through needs assessment,
- 2. Target-focused or having clear objectives,
- **3.** Relevant, direct, and comprehensive intervention approaches,
- **4.** Demonstrating utility value,
- **5.** Assessed to have potential/efforts/constructive support for program sustainability, and
- **6.** Measurable, structured, and sustainable.

Based on these criteria, the following three programs are identified as best practices in this research:




01 The Economic Empowerment Mentoring for Former Terrorist Inmates by <u>Yayasan (Foundation) Prasasti Perdamaian</u>

The mentoring program conducted by the Prasasti Perdamaian Foundation (YPP) is an example of deradicalisation efforts outside of correctional institutions, focusing on economic empowerment. The program includes mentorship and provides financial assistance through skills training in cooking and hospitality for seven former terrorist inmates. Those with the training are given employment opportunities at a restaurant, namely Dapoer Bistik.

Dapoer Bistik is an entrepreneurial venture owned by YPP, initially based in Semarang. However, it was relocated to Surakarta in 2016. Dapoer Bistik also serves as a showcase venue where former terrorist inmates can sell their products through a consignment mechanism. Some of the products they produced and have sold at Dapoer Bistik include snacks (such as crackers and chips) and herbal drinks or remedies.

The program is designed based on the need for reintegrating former terrorist inmates into society and enabling them to become self-reliant through the informal sector. An assessment is conducted in collaboration with the Solo Correctional Board by gathering data from the Community Research Unit (Litmas). YPP also conducts a thorough individual assessment to ensure the program targets the right beneficiaries.




Former terrorist inmates are known to encounter barriers in their societal roles, particularly in the formal sector, due to stigma. This program aims to provide support and promote inclusive interactions for them in the community, not only from fellow former inmates but also from the wider society.

Despite having a well-designed program, it encountered challenges regarding sustainability. The program had to conclude in 2020 due to pandemic-related issues and restaurant management, leading to the closure of Dapoer Bistik.

Based on these observations, there are several key lessons that CSOs should take note of:

- **1.** Develop programs that consider the specific needs of the beneficiaries.
- **2.** Strive for program sustainability by providing not only soft skills but also access to financial resources.
- **3.** Create supportive environments for former terrorist inmates to receive social support.




02 Program of Grassroot Contra-Narration by <u>Imparsial</u>

The program aims to improve community resilience through a method of grassroots interventions. It applies a unique approach by leveraging established community channels, such as civil society groups, as local actors. The program is implemented in Cirebon and Solo Raya, covering Karanganyar, Sukoharjo, and Surakarta.

The program is designed to align with the local community's needs and the available resources. It has five stages:

- **1.** Identifying the local situations, conditions, and actors
- **2.** Strengthening actor capacities through various trainings
- **3.** Establishing local coordination networks
- **4.** Designing activities that align with the local community's aspirations and incorporate PCVE narratives
- **5.** Implementation of activities
- **6.** Periodic monitoring and evaluation of activity implementation by direct and indirect approaches



The intervention program combines an unconventional approach with local economic development initiatives. Counter-narrative messages are incorporated into every product sold to the community. The strategy ensures that the PCVE messages are not preachy/lecturing and directly interact with daily activities.

During the implementation phase, the program involves coordination with local stakeholders and ongoing entrepreneurship mentoring. The program has seen positive responses from the target groups, as evidenced by initiating interactions and forming local working groups (Pokja) involving various community elements. The work has resulted in a comprehensive coordination network, including community leader Pokja, youth Pokja, women's Pokja, and more. These Pokja groups are also connected to government institutions to support the program's implementation.

The program's first phase occurred from October 2019 to May 2021, while the second phase occurred from October 2022 to May 2023. Throughout the implementation, the program has undertaken monitoring and evaluation cycles conducted through coordination with relevant Pokja to enhance the independence and wisdom of the local community. Currently, 500 local interfaith communities have been involved in this program.



03 The Program for the Preparation of Candidates and Prison Officers by the <u>Centre for Detention Studies (CDS)</u>

This training is conducted by the Centre for Detention Studies (CDS). The program is implemented through collaboration between CDS and the Directorate General of Corrections (Ditjenpas), to provide specialised knowledge to prison officers and prospective prison officers in dealing with terrorist inmates. The program is integrated into the Correctional Science Polytechnic (Poltekip) curriculum for trainees or students. For serving prison officers, the program is conducted through training programs in correctional institutions that manage terrorist inmates.

The training materials for trainees and prison officers include skills in interaction and building positive relationships, early detection, inmate assessment, and other relevant skills for handling terrorist inmates. The program's sustainability is maintained by the involvement of relevant policy stakeholders in implementing and utilising the training outcomes.

The training is tailored to the needs of the officers and aspiring officers who currently or will potentially interact with and supervise terrorist inmates. The correctional institutions conduct evaluation and monitoring of the training during the implementation, and the results are reported to CDS. To date, CDS has regularly conducted training for Poltekip and 8 Technical Implementation Units (UPT) of Corrections located in 15 cities in Indonesia, including regions in Central Java, West Java, East Java, and others.



This program has several strengths, including:

- **1.** Integration of the program into the trainee education curriculum
- **2.** Integration of the program with human resources development programs in correctional institutions.
- **3.** Ensuring program sustainability by involving relevant policy stakeholders.
- **4.** Targeted and effective implementation of the training outcomes.



Recommendations





1.

The need for government support and active participation for CSOs in implementing NAP PE at the regional and national levels is required to address funding, collaboration, and bureaucracy challenges. The required support includes:

- Providing open access to funding sources and establishing platforms/channels to leverage the synergy between ministries/agencies and CSOs as PCVE actors. The strategy is necessary to ensure that PCVE efforts by CSOs can be coordinated with the efforts of government agencies and other CSOs, and not centralised merely on specific regions, strategies, and targets.
- Further exploration of collaboration and partnerships with the private sector as alternative program funding sources.



2.

It is important to highlight a need for strategic mapping of the roles of CSOs and the government from the perspective of NAP PE to optimise the roles of each actor. Based on the review of NAP PE implementation, it was found that several focuses and strategies have not been extensively addressed.

Some strategies were either not found or not captured in the research data, such as system development, capacity building of government agencies, involvement in the international arena, and securing vital objects. Upon examination, the limitations faced by CSOs in implementing these strategies are attributed to their limited authority, the absence of policy frameworks governing initiatives, and resource constraints.



3.

It is required to see a need for more sustainable collaborations between the government and CSOs, which include sharing long-term plans and providing structured access to target groups following government programs, ensuring that the implemented programs meet the actual needs. This recommendation is significant because certain target groups have not been adequately addressed, such as protecting vulnerable groups, victim-perpetrator reconciliation, and early detection systems across various sectors. The current programs often focus on the general public as the target audience and emphasise public participation through similar approaches such as awareness campaigns and training. A more diverse and strategic approach will be crucial to achieving optimal outcomes in the future.



4.

It is necessary to have program planning based on needs assessments and periodic monitoring and evaluation within a specified timeframe. Active community participation should be encouraged periodically in community programs.

Program institutionalisation within various government agencies is also essential, along with the active involvement of CSOs in policy-making processes with the government. These strategies are needed to address the issue of sustainability in CSOs' program implementations. On the other hand, some CSOs have already implemented these strategies to ensure program continuity.



5.

To achieve impactful results from each program, every CSO should consider three crucial aspects in program implementation, including addressing the needs of the beneficiaries, ensuring program sustainability, and conducting periodic, measurable, structured, and ongoing evaluation processes.

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